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Abstract: 
The unusual trajectory of settler colonialism in French Algeria, which culminated in the 
exodus of European settlers amidst a bloody struggle for Algerian independence, has often 
limited the interest of scholars who seek to understand settler colonialism as an enduring 
structure of oppression. For their part, scholars of French Algeria have yet to fully engage with 
the intellectual propositions of settler colonial studies, as a field of study which has focused 
primarily on Anglophone and Israeli-Palestinian contexts. The Introduction to this special 
issue seeks to open a research conversation between these groups of scholars, arguing that 
our understanding of all settler colonial contexts can be enriched through this dialogue. In 
revealing the multiple power dynamics of Empire, and providing a framework for addressing 
central questions of sovereignty and identification, settler colonial studies offer productive 
lines of enquiry for scholars of French Algeria, whose research has long been influenced by 
the opposing historical narratives of French and Algerian republicanism. In bringing to the 
fore questions of cultural and linguistic diversity within both settler and indigenous 
populations, and underscoring the emotional dynamics of Empire, research on French Algeria 
can, in return, help shed light on understudied aspects of other settler colonial contexts. 
Beyond this mutually beneficial exchange of perspectives, however, the dialogue between 
these groups of researchers can help to construct comparative and globally connected 
histories of settler colonialism, which bring multiple imperial spaces into the same frame of 
analysis. The Introduction opens this dialogue by mobilising the propositions of settler 
colonial theory to outline the dynamics of the operation of power in settler colonial Algeria, 
before describing the evolution of these dynamics over five historical phases. 
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Inspired by Patrick Wolfe’s differentiation of the structures of colonialism and settler 
colonialism, scholars have proposed various theoretical models for understanding the 
dynamics of power within the settler colonial situation.1  Lorenzo Veracini has identified the 
core dynamics of this situation in his description of the triangular relationships between 
settlers, ‘exogenous Others’ and ‘indigenous Others’.2 These relationships, suggest Caroline 
Elkins and Susan Pederson, multiplied in the twentieth century, particularly in colonies in 
which settlers ‘had to contend with increasingly opinion-sensitive metropoles and 
indigenous majorities that could neither be decisively defeated nor be made to go away’.3 In 
these conditions, argue Elkins and Pederson, a four-way relationship developed between the 
imperial metropole, the local administration, the indigenous population and the settler 
community.4 Such multipolar relationships undoubtedly shaped the practices and 
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mechanisms of colonial rule in French Algeria, where, in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries European settlers constituted a demographic minority in a territory ruled over by a 
highly centralised French state. Settler colonialism in Algeria consequently shared a number 
of the features identified by scholars in other contexts, including attempts to ‘transfer’ the 
indigenous population, the elaboration of an enduring ‘pioneer myth’, the insistence on the 
distinct cultural – or racial - character of the settler community, and a drive towards a form 
of pluralistic settler sovereignty.5 
Although a number of scholars of settler colonialism include Algeria as a point of 
reference, its difference and exceptionalism as a settler colony are frequently noted.6 In 
Algeria, James Belich states, ‘the settler transition was always partial’.7 The historical 
specificities of the French Algerian context – including the heterogenous origins of the 
European population, the complex apparatus of the colonial government, and the exodus of 
settlers at the point of Algerian independence – have limited specialists of settler colonialism 
in their engagement with the colonial territory. The bloody denouement of French Algeria, 
where structures of settler colonial domination were ultimately disrupted by the uprising of 
Algerian nationalists and the departure of the European population, may not, moreover, 
offer a salutary example to politically-engaged scholars who seek to resolve the tensions of 
present-day settler colonial situations.  
For their part, scholars of French Algeria have long been constrained by a French 
republican historiographical tradition which has tended to reduce the examination of settler 
colonialism to a politically-charged interrogation of settlers’ allegiance to the French nation. 
During the Algerian War, the historical questioning of settlers’ claims to ‘Frenchness’ served 
to displace responsibility for acts of colonial violence.8 In the decades following the end of 
the conflict and the ‘repatriation’ of settlers to the metropole, counter-arguments emerged 
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insisting on the complete and unambiguous francisation of the European population of 
Algeria during the Third Republic.9 Shaped by their respective conditions of production, 
these opposing historical narratives converged in their defense of French republicanism, and 
their ultimate affirmation of the binary opposition of ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’.10 Although 
such interpretations have been challenged in recent decades, as scholars question the very 
notion of ‘Frenchness’, and examine its construction in French Algeria,11 there have as yet 
been few attempts to engage explicitly with the propositions of settler colonial studies, as it 
has emerged as a field of research in the twenty-first century.12     
Yet, as this special issue argues, a much greater appreciation of the unstable status of 
Algeria as a settler colony is essential to both scholars of settler colonialism and Franco-
Algerian relations alike. Thus, in exploring the similarities and differences of the Algerian 
case, the articles in this collection make a specific contribution that connects the specificity 
of French Algeria to the generic of settler colonialism. They show that by standing back and 
placing French Algeria within a much broader debate about settler colonialism our 
understanding of French Algeria is significantly deepened and vice-versa. Viewed through 
the analytical framework of settler colonialism, questions of sovereignty, identification and 
demographic composition emerge as central to the historical understanding of not only the 
politics, but also the mentalities, behaviours and emotions of the various communities in 
Algeria and the French metropole. In using these questions to understand the dynamics of 
power in French Algeria, these articles also seek to open fresh lines of enquiry in other 
settler colonial settings. Questions of cultural exchange and multilingual expression amongst 
settlers of diverse European origin, for example, cannot be easily overlooked in the Algerian 
context, but rarely feature in histories of ‘the British World’ or ‘the Anglo World’, despite the 
disparate provenance of the European population.13 In providing such points of comparison 
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this special issue outlines the model for a globally connected and comparative history of 
settler colonialism which examines the exchanges and contacts between multiple colonial 
empires.14 
Settler society in French Algeria was never a static object. It was an unfolding entity 
that was first made possible by the French invasion of 1830. In the ensuing years it would go 
through a number of phases before coming to a dramatic end point with Algerian 
independence in 1962. Nor was settler society a bloc. It was shot through with differences of 
class, gender, national origin and regional background. This internal diversity created 
complex hierarchies of power and ambivalent forms of settler identification. There was no 
single overarching settler narrative but rather a series of intersecting, often paradoxical, 
narratives that shifted according to the socio-historical moment. In trying to map the 
fluctuating relations that existed in different historical phases of settler colonialism in Algeria 
it is useful to think in terms of the dynamics which played out between six interconnected 
forces, the first of which was the French state. The state itself was not a single component, 
but rather a multiplicity of institutions, each of which had different views about the 
governance of French Algeria. Initially, the French Army provided the driving force for the 
invasion and annexation of the territory. Thereafter the interests of the French state were 
always crucial, ultimately becoming the decisive factor when de Gaulle adhered to a process 
of decolonisation in April 1961.    
The structures of local rule provided a second force in the dynamics of settler 
colonialism in Algeria. Despite significant overlap, local authorities were never simply an 
extension of the metropolitan administration. The dissonance of metropolitan and local 
authority created significant tension within the operation of colonial power. Settler leaders 
frequently sought to bend Paris-appointed officials to their will and, if unsuccessful, 
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maneuvered to remove them. Such interactions reflected a deeply held suspicion of the 
government in Paris, particularly evident in the settler protests of the 1890s. These protests 
lead to the creation, in 1901, of the Délégations financières, a local assembly which enjoyed 
some measure of budgetary independence under the auspices of a French state. As David 
Prochaska remarks, ‘the unintended consequence of the French Third Republic applying 
liberal democratic institutions to Algeria was the opportunity it gave the settlers to create 
their own independent power base.’15 Settler representatives defended their limited 
autonomy, expecting the state to protect the colony, without interfering in its affairs. Highly 
conservative, these representatives acted alongside the deputies elected from the colony to 
the French National Assembly to sabotage proposals for political change in the twentieth 
century.    
The dynamics of power were further influenced by the wider settler community. This 
community was internally fractured by intersecting hierarchies of class and national origin. A 
tiny minority of settlers grew rich upon the profits of export agriculture, whilst the vast 
majority were poorer than their contemporaries in mainland France. Although settlement 
was frequently represented as a process of making a barren land bloom, particularly in the 
marshy Mitidja area just south of Algiers, most settlers lived in the coastal towns and cities. 
Those who had fled from Alsace-Lorraine following German annexation in 1871 found 
themselves at the apex of a system of social privilege, above other Frenchmen, Italians and 
Spaniards, and settlers from Malta, who were perceived to occupy a liminal cultural and 
racial space which separated Europeans from Berbers and Arabs. Political and social 
inequality was the cornerstone of settler society. Following legislation in 1889, most 
Europeans in Algeria – regardless of origin – had the rights of French citizens, whilst the 
Arabo-Berber majority was governed according to a separate legal code. Limited interaction 
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between settlers and the so-called ‘indigènes’ contributed to a deeply ingrained settler 
racism that was particularly hostile to any sign of Arabo-Berber social and political 
advancement.  
Arab, Berber and Algerian Jewish populations constituted a fourth force shaping the 
dynamics of settler colonialism. In the decades following the French invasion, settler leaders 
and commentators anticipated the disappearance of these populations, through 
demographic decline or communal segregation. The demographic resurgence of these 
populations from the end of the nineteenth century, however, meant that by 1936 the 
Arabo-Berber population stood at 6 million, in comparison to the settler minority of 1 
million. As forms of Arabo-Berber political organisation diversified from the turn of the 
twentieth century, settler leaders directed their energies towards ensuring the political and 
social privilege of the European minority. Fear of Arabo-Berber incursions on settler privilege 
also contributed to a strong strain of anti-Semitism in settler society. The enfranchisement 
of the Algerian Jews by the republican government in 1870 met continued and violent 
opposition from settlers, who feared that this concession would ultimately lead to 
citizenship for the Arabo-Berber majority, and the end of French Algeria. 
The struggle over the rights and status of the Arabo-Berber majority involved a fifth 
voice, that of metropolitan public opinion. Settlers were sensitive to metropolitan 
perception of colonial society from the mid nineteenth century onwards, though this 
perception itself was based on a limited knowledge of the colonial territory, largely derived 
from primary school lessons, the 1930 centenary celebrations or the 1931 Colonial 
Exhibition. While settlers sought to distinguish themselves from the French of the 
metropole, they also lamented the lack of knowledge which they felt underpinned 
metropolitan ‘Arabophilia’, and exhorted observers on the other side of the Mediterranean 
8  
to celebrate the settler community as defenders of the French empire. The Algerian War, 
and the concern it generated for the fate of French conscripts, transformed public 
understanding of colonial conditions, providing a determining factor in the mobilisation of 
the metropolitan public in favour of de Gaulle’s decolonisation narrative from 1961.       
The dynamics of settler colonialism in Algeria were crucially influenced by a sixth 
factor: the changing international context. This dimension of the settler colonial situation is 
yet to receive sustained attention from scholars, though work on the international 
perspectives of the Algerian War demonstrates its importance.16 Conscious of imperial 
rivalry in North Africa in the nineteenth century, and the development of international 
revolutionary movements in the twentieth century, French colonial authorities attempted to 
insulate Algerian society from outside influences. Settler journalists too, sought to regulate 
links between the local settler community and their various countries of origin, all the while 
denouncing external agitators, from Ottoman spies in the years preceding the First World 
War, to communists and pan-Arabists in the decades following the conflict. It was, however, 
impossible to isolate Algerian society from these international developments. The global 
conflicts of the twentieth century, the Russian Revolution, the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 
formation of the United Nations all conditioned social interactions between the multiple 
groups within the colonial territory, and had far-reaching consequences on Algerian politics.      
As the articles in this special issue reveal, these six intersecting dynamics created the 
unstable realities of French Algeria; they also shaped a profound settler ambivalence to the 
political authority and cultural influence of the French state. This ambivalence in many ways 
surpassed that seen in other colonial territories where settlers necessarily oscillated 
between the need, on one hand, to maintain the privilege of the coloniser, and the appeal, 
on the other, of a process of indigenisation. Settler ambivalence was evident in the 
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resurgent, simultaneous claims to French protection and colonial autonomy, which reached 
their violent apogee during the Algerian War. Throughout the colonial era, settlers weighed 
their desire for autonomy against their feelings of insecurity. Their calculations, which took 
place within the dynamics outlined above, were suffused with emotion: fear of the majority 
Muslim population, fear of Algerian Jews and their perceived political influence, anxieties 
over imperial rivalries in the neighbouring territories of Tunisia and Morocco, concerns over 
diplomatic tensions within Europe and their potential consequences for social relations 
amongst the European national groups in the colony, hopes and aspirations for colonial 
progress – the last of which often gave way to disappointment, anger and a sense of betrayal 
in the wake of decisions made in Paris. Caught between a desire to be recognised by the 
French of the metropole, and a desire to be recognised as different from the French of the 
metropole, the settler community at once loved and rejected its imperial guardian. The 
development of settler ambivalence can be traced over five historical phases: 
 
1830-1870: Invasion, Annexation and the Military Regime    
The conditions of settler ambivalence to French authority were established in the early 
phase of settlement, between the French invasion of Algiers – a semi-autonomous province 
of the Ottoman Empire – in 1830, and the fall of the French Second Empire, under Napoleon 
III, in 1870.  These decades were marked by political instability and regime change in France, 
leading to an uncertain and inconsistent approach to the development of the conquered 
territory and the governance of its heterogeneous population. Faced with widespread 
Muslim opposition to the French presence, and a protracted and bloody struggle against the 
forces of Abd el-Kader, the governments of the Bourbon and Orleanist monarchies regularly 
expressed doubts as to the desirability of securing possession of Algeria. If these doubts had 
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waned by 1848, following the defeat of Abd el-Kader, the proclamation of the Second French 
Republic, and the integration of the conquered territory into the administrative structures of 
the French nation, the question of governance provoked further anxieties. Although, as 
Jennifer Sessions notes, most French officials had come to see settlement as an extension of 
the relation of colonial domination established by military victory, there was little agreement 
as to the status of the growing numbers of non-French Europeans settling in the colony.17 
These settlers, who were primarily of Spanish, Italian and Maltese origin and low 
socioeconomic status, outnumbered settlers of French origin in many areas of the colonial 
territory until the late nineteenth century.18 Alternately viewed as valuable sources of labour 
and disruptive agents of international competition, successive French governments 
hesitated to attribute French citizenship to foreign European nationals.19   
The ethnic and social origins of the settler population contributed to the 
characterisation of the settler colony by the French of the metropole as a place of 
questionable morality, a reputation which was further cemented by the exile to Algeria of 
over 6000 political criminals in the wake of the 1848 revolution and the 1851 Napoleonic 
coup d’état.20 Settlers reacted against what they perceived to be the dismissive attitudes of 
the metropolitan public, using early publications and professional associations to present 
themselves as local experts whose knowledge could be usefully mobilised by the French 
state – if coherent structures of colonial government could be established. Coherent 
structures, however, were not forthcoming. Although the colonial territory had been 
integrated into the administrative apparatus of the French state in 1848, these structures 
existed alongside those of the colonial General Government, established in 1834, and areas 
of military jurisdiction. Settler dissatisfaction with the governance of the territory was 
exacerbated over the course of the Second Empire as the French Army gained greater 
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authority. Although the violence of military rule contributed to the massive demographic 
decline of the Arabo-Berber population during these years,21 settlers perceived military 
institutions such as the Bureaux Arabes – which mediated between the tribes and the state, 
and provided limited medical care to Arabo-Berber communities – as Arabophile. Settler 
hostility to the French Second Empire and its military regime intensified when, in 1863, 
Napoleon III outlined his vision of Algeria not as a colony, but as an ‘Arab kingdom’, and 
when, in 1865, the Emperor cleared the way for the accession to French citizenship of 
individual Algerian Muslims and Jews. Despite the fact that this legislation – which required 
Muslims and Jews to abandon their right to be governed by Koranic or Mosaic law in civil 
affairs – attracted few candidates for naturalisation, it nevertheless, as Todd Shepard 
explains, ‘gave institutional form to the promise of assimilation in Algeria’.22 
 
1870-1908: The Consolidation of Settler Authority 
The collapse of the Second Empire in 1870 was widely celebrated by settlers, who saw the 
transition to the French Third Republic and the subsequent establishment of civil rule in 
Algeria as an opportunity to renegotiate their relationship with the French state and reaffirm 
their authority over Algerian Muslims and Jews. The years between 1870 and 1908 were 
marked by the consolidation of settlers’ ambivalent attitudes to French authority. This 
ambivalence was evident from the very beginning of the period as a revolutionary Commune 
emerged in Algiers, dedicated not only to the defense of the Third Republic from Prussian 
invaders and French monarchists, but also to the elaboration of projects by which settlers 
aimed ‘to take the destiny of Algeria into their own hands’.23 Settlers maintained their 
pressure on the French government throughout these decades through a strong colonial 
lobby in the French parliament, and gained further autonomy over their affairs through the 
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temporary administrative changes of 1881-1896, and the creation of a permanent body – 
the Délégations financières – to allocate the colonial budget, in 1901.24 This increased 
autonomy facilitated the widespread appropriation of land, with devastating consequences 
for Algerians, particularly the nomadic pastoralist tribes.25 
Settler claims to autonomy in this era were increasingly supported by reference to a 
distinctive local cultural community. In their newspapers, their correspondence with the 
authorities, their professional associations and their early works of literature, settlers 
presented themselves as ‘Algerians’ and sought to define their particular traits and qualities. 
Traits frequently evoked by settlers included a rejection of the overly-civilised, ‘effeminate’ 
manners of Europeans on the other side of the Mediterranean, a plain-spokenness, a visceral 
bond with the Algerian soil, and a capacity to endure physical suffering. By the turn of the 
twentieth century settler demographers and doctors were referring to the ‘Algerian’ people 
as ‘neo-Latin’ or as a ‘new white race’, composed of an increasingly intermixed population of 
Frenchmen, Italians and Spaniards.26 References to an ‘Algerian’ settler community or race 
did not, of course, negate the very real differentiation of social status amongst settlers of 
divergent national origins. Settlers of French origin, particularly those from Alsace-Lorraine, 
held a privileged position in colonial society, while those of Maltese origin were denigrated 
and ostracised.27 The imagination of an ‘Algerian’ community nevertheless proved useful to 
settlers in the wake of the 1889 law which effected the automatic collective naturalisation of 
Europeans born in Algeria, as many settlers struggled to balance their new political identity 
with their mixed cultural heritage. Invocations of an idealised ‘Algerian’ settler community 
likewise proved useful in the context of Franco-Italian rivalry in Tunisia, and Franco-Spanish 
competition in Morocco.      
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Despite their drive for increased administrative and cultural autonomy, settlers were 
anxious to retain both the protection and the recognition of the French state. The 1871 
revolt of 150,000 Muslims in Kabylia, led by El-Mokhrani, ensured that security remained a 
constant preoccupation of settlers in these decades.28 Beyond protection, however, settlers 
wanted the French of the metropole to understand and acknowledge the risks and sacrifices 
of settlement. Their hopes in this regard were frequently disappointed as metropolitan 
politicians and journalists – concerned about ‘foreign’ influence on settler mentalities, and 
prompted by the first generations of Muslim reformers – attempted to displace 
responsibility for colonial violence onto the settler community. The sense of betrayal felt by 
settlers faced with the criticism and misunderstanding of the French government and the 
French public was heightened by the failure of the government to resolve other perceived 
problems. These included the ongoing complexities of the dual administrative system, and 
the influence of Algerian Jews in colonial society following their collective enfranchisement 
by the republican government of 1870. These issues converged to fuel a small but militant 
separatist movement in the late 1890s. Even settler separatism, however, was characterised 
by ambivalence: in the wake of the violent demonstrations of the turn of the century, former 
separatists admitted that their fleeting rejection of the French state had been founded on a 
desire to be better loved by the French nation.   
 
1908-1945: The Rise of Algerian Nationalism in an Era of Global Rights 
The limited autonomy gained by settlers in the wake of the violence of the 1890s and the 
establishment of the Délégations financières in 1901, was soon challenged by the French 
state, which proposed in 1908, to extend conscription to Algerian Muslims. Acutely 
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conscious of the demographic imbalance between France and Germany, especially in terms 
of men of fighting age, the state sought to marshal resources in French Algeria and across 
the Empire. Settler leaders were horrified by this proposal, opposing the arming of Algerians 
on the basis that the new recruits could turn this military knowledge against settler rule. 
Furthermore, settlers feared that conscription could lead to Algerian demands for citizenship 
rights. Rejecting the proposal, numerous town halls refused to carry out the necessary 
census of the Muslim population, while Gaston Thomas, the deputy for Constantine in the 
National Assembly, resigned as Minister for the Navy. The settler press also mounted a 
vociferous campaign which intensified still further when, following the formal introduction 
of Muslim conscription in 1911, middle-class Muslims calling themselves ‘Young Algerians’ 
drew up a Manifesto demanding enlarged suffrage for Algerians and representation in the 
French National Assembly. In June 1912 a delegation presented these demands in person to 
the Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré, immediately provoking further ire from settler 
journalists, who denounced the ‘Young Algerians’ as Ottoman spies.  
The crisis of 1908-1911 crystallised tensions which continued to define the contours 
of French Algeria until 1946. The event affirmed the primacy of the interests of the French 
state, which had been willing to countenance reform – albeit always within a context of 
French sovereignty – in return for military resources. Indeed, the state proposed to give a 
small minority of Algerians greater rights as a reward for Muslim participation in the war 
effort. This reformist logic was also evident in later proposals to extend Muslim 
enfranchisement, albeit in a very limited way. Reforms proposed by the Popular Front in 
1936 were actually implemented by de Gaulle in March 1944. These reforms, however, were 
greeted with hostility by settler leaders who saw their role as one of defending the status 
quo established in 1901. These leaders continually displayed an entrenched attitude, either 
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sabotaging such reforms in the National Assembly through the colonial lobby or, if legislation 
was passed, dragging their feet and preventing the practical application of reforms on the 
ground. This pronounced conservatism also explains why the authoritarian Vichy regime 
received such widespread support amongst the settler population.  
The settlers’ fear of political change was driven in part by the demographic realities 
of the period. Between 1908 and 1946 the settler population remained constant, flat-lining 
at one million, while the Arabo-Berber population shot up to over seven million.  Many 
settlers felt outnumbered and consequently fearful about the future of French Algeria. Their 
fears were exacerbated by the fact that this population explosion was accompanied by 
another new factor: the politicisation of Muslim society. Politicisation was initially limited to 
a tiny minority of middle-class Muslims who wanted to ensure equality with French citizens. 
However, by 1946, Muslim mass politics had become a reality, with political parties 
demanding not just greater rights, but full independence. This mass politics was defined by 
the language of political and human rights, with the wording of the 1912 Manifesto inspired 
by French republicanism derived from the 1789 French Revolution. Subsequently, their 
demands would be shaped by the international language of human rights, notably the 1941 
Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill and enshrining the national right to self-
determination, and the formation of the United Nations. This move to a new mass politics 
was also influenced by developments in the Arab and Muslim world, specifically the Islamic 
Renaissance Movement and pan-Arab nationalism, which both opposed colonial rule in the 
Middle East and North Africa. The impact of the end of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian 
Revolution and the two World Wars also contributed to this transformation. In this sense 
French Algeria could not be separated from global political developments, nor could it be 
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separated from global economics. Indeed the impact of the 1930s global economic 
depression was crucial in radicalising Algerian politics.  
 
1945 to 1962: International Pressure and the Algerian War 
In May 1945 French Algeria witnessed mass political demonstrations by Algerian nationalists 
in all the major towns and cities. Anticipating the formation of the United Nations in San 
Francisco, these protestors wanted to show that the Algerian nation existed and was ready 
to take its place amongst the nation states of the world. On 8 May one demonstration in 
Sétif in eastern Algeria led to widespread anti-settler violence that resulted in the death of 
twenty-one settlers. The event precipitated massive counter-violence from the French state 
as the Army re-established French rule across the Sétif region. Three years later the 
nationalist press would talk of 20,000 dead, while post-independence Algerian estimates 
have never been less than 45,000.  
In many ways this violent moment contained all the hallmarks of the previous phase. 
Once again, the interests of the French state were paramount, as the government sought to 
reassert national sovereignty after the Nazi occupation. Settler fears of social and political 
change were also in evidence, faced with a self-confident Algerian nationalist movement 
which believed that Algerian independence was imminent. However, this moment was 
different in three crucial respects. Part of the nationalist movement was now committed to 
the violent overthrow of French Algeria. The newly-established United Nations, moreover, 
enshrined a clear decolonisation narrative – one where the demand for national self-
determination would led to a nation-state and a seat at the UN Assembly.  In addition to 
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this, the geopolitical shift produce by the global conflict had produced two new super-
powers – the USA and the USSR – both of which were resolutely anti-colonial.   
These new factors defined the final phase of French Algeria which led to Algerian 
independence in July 1962. Thus, in November 1954 the National Liberation Front (FLN) 
launched a national war of liberation that was based upon a strategy of violence. Over the 
next two years the FLN came to predominate over all nationalist rivals. Settler leaders and 
the settler community as a whole recoiled in horror at the FLN tactics and demanded 
protection from the French state. Settler intransigence grew as they monitored political 
developments in Paris, considering any possibility of negotiation between the French 
government and the FLN to be unthinkable. The position of the French state did, however, 
change. In 1956 the Republican Front government deployed massive resources – both 
military and economic – in an effort to reform French Algeria. The government sought to 
create greater equality in colonial society by enacting the political changes encapsulated in 
the 1947 statute, and thereby protecting French sovereignty at the expense of settler 
privilege. This strategy was based on the premise that a reformed French Algeria would 
become the lynchpin of a Eurafrican bloc, which – combined with the imminent creation of 
the European Economic Community – would situate France as a geopolitical force to counter 
the USA and USSR. The French government also hoped to protect the gas and oil resources 
that had been discovered in the Sahara, as the basis of the country’s future economic 
strength.  
Yet, by April 1961 de Gaulle had come to the clear conclusion that French Algeria was 
no longer in the interests of the French state. Not only was the maintenance of colonial rule 
a strain on the French budget, but it was doing grave damage to France’s international 
image. Within the metropole, pressure to end the conflict mounted as the tide of public 
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opinion – concerned about the fate of French conscripts – turned against further military 
involvement. Outside of France, calls to end the conflict were accompanied by pressure to 
initiate a process of decolonisation. The USA had repeatedly underlined that, in the context 
of the Cold War, French Algeria and its negative global perception posed a threat to the 
strength and credibility of NATO. By 1961, France was hopelessly isolated at the UN as all the 
newly-independent former colonies lined up to support the Algerian cause. For settlers, 
however, the effect of the new policy of decolonisation was cataclysmic. As the French state 
sought to withdraw from Algeria, some settlers resorted to terrorism in the hope that they 
could prevent the definitive abandonment of their community. Their actions fed into the 
bloody and chaotic denouement of French Algeria, which resulted in the mass exodus of the 
settlers.          
 
Post-1962: Memory Wars  
For many historians, 1962 marks the end of France’s ambitions towards empire, and a 
definitive turn away from its identity as a colonial power and towards a new future in 
Europe.29 Kristin Ross has persuasively argued that the move to post-war modernisation, 
facilitated by immigration from North Africa, quickly made colonialism seem ‘like a dusty 
archaism’ such that, like a classic case of Freudian repression, the war and the consequent 
loss of Algeria were soon forgotten by the general population.30 In tracing the afterlives of 
the war and the amnesia which has surrounded it, critics have adapted and applied Henry 
Rousso’s seminal psychoanalytic analysis of Vichy France, pointing to the ways in which the 
unhealed wounds of the war have demonstrated a propensity to re-emerge onto the public 
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scene in the wake of events such as the Papon trial (1997-98), and the controversy 
surrounding the French army’s use of torture (2000).31 
In contrast to the amnesia and apathy among the general population, the post-war 
experience of the 800,000 or so settlers ‘repatriated’ to France in the summer of 1962 was 
very different. Received as colonisers and oppressors by the left wing, and resented 
generally for the cost, human and financial, of the war, they were traumatised by the loss of 
their homeland and struggled initially with the practical difficulties of finding 
accommodation and employment amidst public services overwhelmed by the number of 
arrivals. The consequences of the war were so far-reaching that, for many former settlers 
(now termed ‘pieds-noirs’), it would prove impossible to move on. Their attachment to the 
now defunct colonial worldview, their sense of betrayal at de Gaulle’s putative 
abandonment, and their rejection by the Communist movement to which many settlers had 
once belonged, combined to draw together the once disparate political views of the settler 
collective in generalized support for the far right, pro-Algérie française politics of Tixier-
Vignancour and, later, the National Front. Political mobilization followed: the cultural 
association, ANFANOMA, created in 1956 by French settlers returning from Morocco and 
Tunisia, began the political campaign for the repatriates, initially focusing on indemnification 
for their material losses, and subsequently lobbying for symbolic public acknowledgement of 
the settlers’ suffering.32 ANFANOMA was soon joined by a proliferation of cultural 
associations, which were frequently structured around the repatriates’ area of residence in 
Algeria and which sought to recreate the memories and culture of the colonial community. 
As the repatriate community has aged, the associations represent an ever-reducing fraction 
of settlers and their descendants; conversely, in order to amplify their demands for official 
state recognition the associations have been obliged to adopt a simplified narrative which 
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elides the nuances of the historical experience. From these recreations of the Algerian 
settler community emerged the discourses of nostalgia (‘nostalgérie’) for their lost paradise 
(‘paradis perdu’), and representations of the settlers as innocent victims of Gaullist duplicity.  
This emerging narrative foregrounded the experiences of the European repatriates; it 
is notable that Algeria’s Jewish population, most of which was forced to leave in 1962 as part 
of the settler community, did not generally form part of the pied-noir community once back 
in France but instead integrated into France’s existing Jewish community or, in many cases, 
chose to leave for Israel. The narrative also excludes the thousands of settlers (the so-called 
‘pieds-verts’) who defied the ultimatum of ‘the suitcase or the coffin’, and who chose to stay 
in an independent Algeria, embracing the ideals of the new state. Many stayed only a few 
years, leaving for France in the course of the 1960s but not reintegrating into the repatriated 
settler community.  
The narrative established by the pied-noir associations, which highlighted in 
particular the violence (widespread kidnappings, and massacres in Algiers and Oran involving 
the French army) suffered by the community in the months leading up to independence, 
aimed to counter the widespread perception of the repatriates as colonists and racists. 
These two versions of history played into wider debates taking place in France in the early 
twenty-first century concerning how those living in France should remember controversial 
periods of the country’s past, with certain constituencies, including writers such as Daniel 
Lefeuvre, Pascal Bruckner and Jean-Pierre Rioux, castigating the move to reassess the 
colonial past as part of a deplorable Western tendency towards intellectual self-
flagellation.33 The debate took a juridical turn with the Taubira Law (2001) on the slave 
trade, which was followed by the Law of 23 February 2005, article four of which established 
the responsibility of teachers to present ‘the positive role of the French presence in its 
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overseas territories, particularly in North Africa’.34 Immediately controversial and later 
abrogated, this clause nonetheless testified to the success of the pied-noir lobby in achieving 
state recognition of its view of colonial history in Algeria. Indeed, arguably it signalled the 
high-water mark for the pieds-noirs in terms of succeeding in having their memories 
accepted within the official historiography: by 2012 and the commemorations of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Algerian independence, the media in particular was concerned to reflect the 
spectrum of perspectives of those involved in the war, such that the pied-noir experience 
was relativised as merely one of many in a mosaic of memories.35  
In Algeria, independence was followed by the creation of an official historiography of 
the war which emphasized the heroic anti-colonial resistance of the Algerian people, and 
transformed the one million war dead into so many martyrs of the nation. The preservation 
of a single unified narrative of nationalist revolution with the FLN at its head elided the 
brutal internecine conflicts between rival nationalist groups that had led to thousands of 
Algerian deaths. Instead, France was presented as the sole enemy, and its settlers the 
embodiment of colonial evil, all traces of which had to be purged in order to ensure the 
survival of the Algerian nation. Yet from the 1980s onwards cracks began to appear in the 
narrative as it was challenged from a number of directions. The economic difficulties 
experienced by other newly independent states such as Zimbabwe led many to question the 
feasibility of the better future promised by the regime, which also came under attack from 
the growing Islamist and Berberist movements; these appropriated the regime’s own 
strategy to accuse the military of having betrayed the ideals of the anti-colonial struggle and 
having become in their turn, hizb fransa (‘the party of France’).36 The violence of the conflict 
which followed, and which saw government forces as well as certain Islamist groups 
implicated in atrocities of unspeakable horror, has left a legacy of cynicism amongst a 
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population denied any moves towards truth and justice. Bouteflika’s regime has continued 
to insist upon the narrative of liberation as the founding event of the new state, but 
increasingly this has been called into question by the efforts of academics, such as Benjamin 
Stora and Mohammed Harbi, whose work represents the experiences of both Algeria and 
France but who have strived to construct a common history of the Algerian war.37  
In this way the memory wars over French Algeria have to be understood as a trans-
national phenomenon where contemporary events in both countries shape and reshape 
remembering. Thus, the unfolding bloodshed in Algeria from 1992 onwards was a crucial 
backdrop to public attempts within France to rehabilitate French Algeria, culminating with 
the 2005 Law. Now pied-noir groups could point to the seeming implosion of post-
independence Algeria in order to argue for the positive legacy of settler colonialism in 
French Algeria. Equally, this perspective produced a vociferous reaction in Algeria. Explicitly 
citing the 2005 Law President Bouteflika used the sixtieth anniversary of the Sétif massacre, 
in May 2005, to denounce France as a country in denial about colonial atrocities, even 
describing French actions as genocidal. Similarly these specific memory wars have been 
moulded by the more general international narratives of remembering; one where the 
optimism of post-independence decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s had given way by the 
1980s to a much more pessimistic picture of corruption and failed promises.  
The tensions surrounding the incorporation of the settler experience within the 
French national historiography speak to the ambivalence which has characterized the place 
occupied by the settlers within the French nation throughout the period of the colonization 
of Algeria. Homi Bhabha’s reference to the ‘ambivalent temporalities of the nation-space’ 
reminds us that French Algeria intersected only intermittently and awkwardly with the 
historical time of the French state.38 As critics such as Charles Forsdick have pointed out, the 
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emphasis on the historiography of France as essentially Hexagonal has had the effect of 
creating ‘a certain idea of France’, one where the settlers found themselves accommodated 
only with difficulty.39 Located on the periphery of the nation, the settlers were effectively 
semi-detached from the narrative vision of the state, producing the uncertainties and 
tensions which characterized relations with the metropole, and which feature in the articles 
in this issue. Settler anxieties emanated from the disconnect between the settlers’ sense of 
their own identity and future, and their perception of the powerful, civilized but moribund 
metropole, anxieties which resulted from the implicit racial and cultural hierarchies that 
stalked the insecure settler population, conscious of its mixed origins and demographic 
vulnerability. Vaunting its youth and vibrancy but always aware of the threat to French 
purity posed by uncultured elements from a variety of non-indigenous others, settler 
identity oscillated between demands for autonomy and the need for reassurance. The 
history of French Algeria is to a large extent the process of negotiating these demands, a 
process which came to an abrupt end in 1962 when the settlers’ liminal position at the 
margins of the state was dissolved. From then, the temporal disconnect became manifest, 
with the settlers cut off from the teleological progress of the modern post-colonial nation, 
arguing their case for the past as it slips into what Bhabha calls ‘the “timeless” discourse of 
irrationality’.40  
To understand the history of Algeria’s settler colonialism requires an awareness of 
the complex dynamics which operated between the six competing centres of interest 
outlined above. The articles which follow are organized according to the chronology 
described above and engage with different facets of the settler colonial situation, tracing the 
dynamics as they evolve from the late nineteenth century through the crisis of 
independence to the present day. The issue opens with an analysis of the early conquest of 
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Algeria by William Gallois, who uses the work of indigenous writers to argue that the coming 
of the French led to the replacement of an Islamic state of being with the being of the state 
in the 1830s and the ‘40s. Charlotte Chopin’s analysis moves forward in time to focus on the 
development of settler colonial culture, examined via the settler colonial press at the turn of 
the twentieth century, and the processes of cultural and political identification that led to 
construction of the notion of a ‘Latin’ identity. Rather than being defined solely by the 
colonial relationship with France, Chopin demonstrates that Algeria’s settler identity was 
created by an inter-imperial network of connections between diverse settler societies, which 
fed into debates about settler sovereignty, and the creation of a transnational model of 
‘Latin’ community, whilst also reinforcing the exclusion of the Muslim and Jewish 
communities. David Cummings’ article on settler colonial literature continues the analysis of 
settler identity, examining how author Paul Achard (1887-1962) worked to ‘indigenise’ the 
settler community. As in Chopin’s article, Cummings’ work emphasizes the significance of 
the ‘Latin’ identity, but also its instability and ambivalence as it both gestures towards and 
pulls away from French cultural hegemony, and the non-French European settlers who 
constituted an important element of the colony. 
The logic of elimination, and its contribution to the ambivalence of Algeria’s settlers 
is the subject of Donal Hassett’s article, which examines how this ideology, frequently 
regarded as integral to settler colonialism, was manifested amidst the demographic and 
political realities of French Algeria. Through analysis of the extreme-right in interwar Algeria, 
he argues that the settler collective was continually forced into creative compromise in 
order to maintain its predominance in the face of the political power of metropolitan France, 
and the demographic power of the Muslim majority. The response of settlers caught 
between metropolitan dominance and Muslim ascendance is explored further in the article 
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by Martin Evans, which looks at the complex emotional relationship between the settlers 
and Charles de Gaulle, as the settlers’ position evolved from one of faith in May 1958 to the 
fear and anger of January 1960. Evans analyses how de Gaulle used television to project an 
image of political masculinity which foregrounded French rationality in order to justify his 
decolonisation strategy, and which consequently presented the settlers as irrational and 
unrealistic in their political aims. His analysis of the emotional dynamics of settler 
colonialism is taken up by Fiona Barclay, whose article looks at the emotional experiences of 
the settlers who were repatriated to France following Algeria’s independence. Drawing on 
literary analysis, she argues that the success of de Gaulle’s strategy in presenting the settlers 
as ‘other’ led to the re-creation within metropolitan France of the conditions of colonial 
oppression, and that consequently the former settlers should be conceptualised not as guilty 
colonisers or injured victims, but as individuals whose positionality was subject to continual 
renegotiation in a site of postcolonial conflict. The final article, by Emmanuelle Comtat, 
continues the postcolonial analysis of the former settlers, using analysis of quantitative data 
to analyse the settler colonial present, and determine the extent to which the attitudes of 
the settlers and their descendants reveal a specificity and a continuity linked to the colonial 
experience of the European settler community. 
If the multi-dimensional model applied here serves to explore the particularities of 
Algeria’s exceptionalism, the expectation is that it will also provide a theoretical framework 
to analyse other settler colonial contexts and so contribute to the development of a more 
comprehensive understanding of the functioning of settler societies, past and present. By 
opening up a research conversation between the histories of settler colonialism in the 
Anglophone and Francophone empires, the intention of this special issue is to move beyond 
the Anglophone examples that have framed the debate so far and open up the way to a 
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globally connected and comparative history of settler colonialism that must also integrate a 
detailed consideration of the Lusophone and Hispanic worlds.  
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